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699 
EVERY CLICK YOU MAKE: HOW THE 
PROPOSED DISCLOSURE OF LAW 
STUDENTS’ ONLINE IDENTITIES VIOLATES 
THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
FREE ASSOCIATION 
Jonathan Sabin  
[W]hen a state attempts to make inquiries about a person‘s 
beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First 
Amendment. Broad and sweeping inquiries into these 
protected areas . . . discourage citizens from exercising 
rights protected by the Constitution.
1
 
 
You already have zero privacy. Get over it.
2
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the hyper-connected world of online communication, we are 
all just a few clicks away from Internet infamy.
3
 Law students are 
                                                        
  Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; M.A. (Journalism) New York 
University, 2002; B.A. Tufts University, 1999. Thanks to my mother, father, and 
sister for all their love and support. Special thanks to Hila, whose constant 
encouragement, enduring patience, and sense of humor got me through law 
school. 
1 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
2 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 105 (2007) (quoting Scott McNealy, CEO Sun 
Microsystems). 
3 See Rachel Abramowitz, Hollywood Brief: Christian Bale’s Call of 
Contrition, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at E1 (reporting that Batman star Christian 
Bale publicly apologized after a ―profanity-ridden audiotape of [him] ranting at 
the director of photography on the set of [a movie] hit the Internet . . .‖). 
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no exception.
4
 Armed with laptops, unlimited bandwidth, and an 
inclination for procrastination, aspiring attorneys have proven 
particularly susceptible to online misbehavior.
5
 For example, after 
a Brooklyn Law School student posed naked for an online Playboy 
video in 2006, a link to the video was forwarded to the student‘s 
classmates, professors, and prospective employers.
6
 Meanwhile, on 
Autoadmit.com, one of the largest and bawdiest message boards 
for current and prospective law students,
7
 several anonymous law 
students posted sexually offensive and humiliating comments 
about their colleagues at Yale Law School.
8
 
To make matters worse, this Internet misconduct is 
increasingly finding its way to the inboxes of potential employers.
9
 
According to a survey from the online job site Careerbuilder.com, 
                                                        
4 For example, in an email to Brooklyn Law School students, Dean Joan 
Wexler noted that ―[o]ver the last few years we have seen instances, both here at 
our law school and at law schools across the country, where individuals have 
been the victims of discussions on blogs, mostly anonymous, that go beyond the 
bounds of civilized discourse.‖ E-mail from Joan Wexler, Dean, Brooklyn Law 
School & Beryl Jones-Woodin, Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Brooklyn 
Law School, to Brooklyn Law School Community (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with 
author).  
5  See Katherine Mangan, Etiquette for the Bar, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Jan. 12, 2007, at 31 (noting that law students at Drake University had set up 
inflammatory Facebook groups called ―I Hate Legal Writing‖ and ―Drake Law 
Drunks‖). 
6 Veronika Belenkaya, It’s Juris-Imprudence: Holy Torts! Law Student in 
Erotic Vid, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10, 2007, at 3. 
7 Autoadmit.com boasts around one million unique visitors a month. See 
Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web: Law Students Feel 
Lasting Effects of Anonymous Attacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A01. 
8 Id. See also David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO MAG., Mar. 
2009 (reporting that the anonymous users falsely claimed that certain Yale 
students had herpes, bribed their way into Yale, and that one of them 
―exchanged oral sex with Yale Law School‘s dean for a passing grade in civil 
procedure‖).  
9 See Alan Finder, When a Risque Online Persona Undermines a Chance 
for a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11, 2006, at Nat‘l Desk 1 (―[S]ome recruiters are 
looking up applicants on social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, 
Xanga and Friendster, where college students often post risqué or teasing 
photographs and provocative comments about drinking, recreational drug use 
and sexual exploits in what some mistakenly believe is relative privacy.‖). 
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over twenty-five percent of hiring managers perform Internet 
searches when vetting job applicants.
10
 At Georgetown University, 
a law firm interviewer reportedly confronted a law student with 
pictures from his Facebook page showing him flipping his middle 
finger.
11
 
Michelle Morris, a lecturer in law at the University of Virginia 
Law School, believes that Internet misbehavior among law 
students has gotten out of control: 
Many law students are enjoying an ―extended adolescence‖ 
marked by inappropriate and immature behavior. From a 
law student flashing traffic and then taunting police, to 
Facebook.com profiles that openly celebrate law students‘ 
illegal, immoral or unwise behavior, a visible population 
openly prioritizes ―fun today‖ over preparation for 
tomorrow. . . . Millennial generation law students in 
particular tend to compound this lack of judgment with a 
propensity for posting every detail of their lives online, 
creating a potentially permanent record of every unwise 
choice they might make. They seem to believe that what is 
―online‖ is not ―real‖ and cannot impact the physical world. 
Only friends are supposed to see the photos they post of 
themselves drunken and half-dressed. Only fellow jokesters 
on your message board will read your juvenile threats, and 
they will relish your savage sense of humor.
12
 
To combat this scourge of Internet malfeasance, Morris 
proposes that law schools require all applicants to disclose their 
                                                        
10 Press Release, Careerbuilder.com (Oct. 26, 2006), available at 
http://careerbuilder.com (follow ―About Us‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Press 
Release Archive 2006‖ hyperlink; then follow ―10/26/06‖ hyperlink). Twelve 
percent of the hiring managers surveyed searched social networking sites when 
screening applicants. Id.  
11 Sheila Marikar, After Years of Telling All, 20-Somethings Start to Clam 
Up, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 1, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/Technology/Story?id=2912364&page=1. The interviewer allegedly asked 
the student how he planned to represent the law firm in light of the obscene 
gesture in the photograph. Id. 
12 Michelle Morris, The Legal Profession, Personal Responsibility, and the 
Internet, 117 YALE L.J. 53, 56 (Pocket Part 2007). 
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online identities before enrolling in law school.
13
 In her opinion, 
―aspiring lawyers need to understand that Internet activity is public 
behavior and conduct themselves accordingly.‖14 Under the 
―Morris Plan,‖ law school applicants would have to divulge a 
three-year history of ―e-mail addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and 
social networking profile information.‖15 Morris argues that this 
would deter inappropriate online behavior while enabling law 
schools to tie ―bad behavior to particular people.‖16 Finally, it 
would send a message to law students: ―Clean up your act. We‘re 
watching.‖17 
Despite its admirable intentions, the ―Morris Plan,‖ as applied 
to state law schools, is poor public policy that runs afoul of the 
First Amendment right to free association.
18
 The Supreme Court 
                                                        
13 Id. at 58. Morris also proposes that the American Bar Association (ABA) 
institute the same disclosure policy as part of their ―Good Moral Character‖ 
requirement. However, this Note focuses only on the disclosure requirement for 
law school applicants. For a detailed discussion of the ABA‘s ―Good Moral 
Character‖ requirement, see Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights: 
Understanding the “Good Moral Character” Examination for Bar Applicants, 
40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007); Elizabeth Gepford McCulley, School of Sharks? 
Bar Fitness Requirements of Good Moral Character and the Role of Law 
Schools, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (2001). 
14 Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
15 Id. at 58. It is not clear whether Morris intends for this identifying 
information to be used only for admission purposes, or whether it would be 
retained (and possibly accessed) for the duration of the law student‘s enrollment. 
For information about Internet protocol (IP) addresses, see infra note 34. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 As ―state actors,‖ state law schools are bound by the Constitution. See 
generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (noting that the race-based 
admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School triggered strict 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment). For this reason, this Note focuses 
on the constitutionality of the Morris Plan as applied by state law schools. 
However, private law schools may also be considered ―state actors.‖ See, e.g., 
Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 
295 (2001) (―[S]tate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 
‗close nexus between the State and the challenged action‘ that seemingly private 
behavior ‗may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.‘‖) (quoting Jackson v. 
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). For a detailed examination of the 
―state action‖ doctrine, see, for example, Michael L. Wells, Private Parties as 
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has described the freedom of association as the ―right to associate 
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.‖19 In addition, 
the Court has consistently held that mandatory disclosure of 
membership lists that might have a chilling effect on an 
individual‘s exercise of his or her associational freedoms violates 
the First Amendment.
20
 Thus, the Morris Plan fails to recognize 
that the right to free association protects all types of association, 
whether they occur in a boardroom or in the blogosphere.
21
 
This Note examines the faults with the Morris Plan and offers 
alternative ways to promote ethical online conduct at public law 
schools that would not run afoul of the Constitution. Part I of this 
Note explores the social, political, and cultural aspects of Internet 
use among law students. Part II reviews freedom of association 
case law up through Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
22
 the Supreme 
Court‘s most recent examination of the issue. Part III argues that 
(1) blogs and social-networking activity, conducted with online 
aliases, email and IP addresses, are ―expressive associations‖23 that 
are entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) mandatory 
disclosure of online associations by state law schools would have a 
chilling effect on student association;
24
 and (3) the disclosure 
                                                        
Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation: Identifying State Actors in Constitutional 
Litigation: Reviving the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 
(2004). 
19 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
20 See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Gibson v. Fla. 
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  
21 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (―[T]he First 
Amendment protects the Boy Scouts‘ method of expression.‖) (second emphasis 
added). 
22 Dale, 530 U.S. 640. 
23 See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618. 
24 This Note does not consider the Morris Plan‘s potential infringement on 
student free speech. For a detailed discussion of student free speech on college 
campuses, see, for example, Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High 
School: Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High 
School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173 (2003); Chris Sanders, Commentary, 
Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at 
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requirement ultimately violates the First Amendment because 
while it may address compelling state interests, those interests may 
be achieved by means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms. Finally, Part IV offers several alternative measures law 
schools might enact to promote ethical online conduct while 
preserving associational freedoms. 
I. ONLINE ACTIVITY: AMBIENTLY AWARE OR PORNOGRAPHIC 
LITTLE LOONS? 
According to Morris, the Internet enables ―tech-savvy‖25 law 
students to embarrass themselves, other students, and the law 
school by hurling insults from behind a veil of anonymity.
26
 Law 
schools, she argues, have an obligation to stem the tide of online 
misconduct ―[t]o avoid further injury to the reputation of our law 
schools and the legal profession.‖27 Morris‘ characterization of 
Internet use among law students, however, is overly broad and 
general.
28
 By failing to fully examine the breadth and complexity 
                                                        
Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2006). For a close examination 
of student free speech on the Internet, see Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. 
Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835 (2008); Kara D. Williams, Public Schools vs. 
Myspace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 707 (2008). 
25 Morris, supra note 12, at 53. 
26 Id. at 58–59 (explaining that the disclosure requirement would ―make[] 
clear to anonymous abusers that their behavior is relevant whether or not 
conducted in their own names‖). On Autoadmit.com, for example, users can 
create an anonymous ―Login Name.‖ Autoadmit.com homepage, 
http://autoadmit.com (follow ―Register‖ hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
And according to one survey, twenty percent of bloggers who self-identified on 
their blog use a variant of their real name. SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting 
Fernanda B. Viégas, Bloggers’ Expectations of Privacy and Accountability: An 
Initial Survey, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., vol. 10, issue 3 (2005), 
available at http://jcmc.Indiana.edu/vol10/issue3/viegas.html).  
27 Morris, supra note 12, at 53. There is some precedent to Morris‘ call for 
action: the University of New Mexico temporarily banned access to 
Facebook.com. Cristian Lupsa, Facebook: A Campus Fad Becomes a Campus 
Fact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2006, at 13. 
28 See Morris, supra note 12, at 56 (―From a law student flashing traffic and 
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of law student online expression, Morris misidentifies the problem 
that her plan seeks to remedy.
29
  
Contrary to Morris‘ dismissive portrayal, the Internet has 
emerged as the modern public commons—a space where young 
people freely and frequently engage in a variety of social and 
political discourse.
30
 But modern Internet expression is not easily 
reduced.
31
 Rather, it is infinitely diverse and complex.
32
 Platforms 
for Internet self-expression and communication include e-mail, 
weblogs, wikis, social networking sites, peer-to-peer technology, 
open source software, and social ―tagging‖ applications.33 The 
Morris Plan, however, is indiscriminate: it implicates all of these 
online entities because it requires disclosure of student IP 
addresses.
34
 Disclosure of one‘s IP address means, at least  
 
                                                        
then taunting police, to Facebook.com profiles that openly celebrate law 
students‘ illegal, immoral or unwise behavior, a visible population openly 
prioritizes ‗fun today‘ over preparation for tomorrow.‖) (citations omitted). 
29 Morris may also overstate the problem: nearly ninety-five percent of 
Facebook users use their real name. Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? 
Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. 
SCI., TECH. & SOC‘Y 20, 26 (2008). 
30 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a 
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2008) (―The Internet, embodied in the World Wide 
Web, email, listserves, chat rooms, weblogs, and instant messaging, has 
revolutionized the organization of grassroots political movements.‖). 
31 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and 
Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age: Social Software, Groups, and 
Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153, 156 (2006) (arguing that ―[c]omputer 
users are using technology collaboratively, explicitly, and in a multiplicity of 
ways that we can see for the first time‖). 
32 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 17 (―The Internet allows information to 
flow more freely than ever before. We can communicate and share ideas in 
unprecedented ways. These developments are revolutionizing our self-
expression and enhancing our freedom.‖). 
33 See Madison, supra note 31, at 157–64. 
34 Effectively all Internet activity falls under the Morris Plan since it 
requires disclosure of student IP addresses. See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 143, 
147 (explaining that an IP address is ―a unique number that is assigned to every 
computer connected to the Web . . . and that [w]henever a user communicates 
over the Internet, her IP address is logged‖). 
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potentially, the disclosure of everything one is doing with that IP 
address.
35
 
 This Note focuses on two of the largest and most popular 
vehicles for online expression targeted by the Morris Plan: blogs 
and social networking sites.
36
 Although the mandatory disclosure 
of student e-mail addresses is particularly troubling, Morris seems 
interested in e-mail addresses only in so far as they are used to 
engage in unethical online conduct at websites and blogs like 
Facebook and Autoadmit.
37
 For this reason, this Note focuses on 
the associational aspects of blogs and social-networking sites. 
A. Blogs and Social-Networking Sites: The Basics 
As of 2009, forty-three percent of people age eighteen to thirty-
two read blogs; twenty percent created one.
38
 Blogs come in 
several varieties.
39
 Some resemble personal online diaries
40
 where 
the blogger confesses everything from what he or she ate for 
lunch
41
 to his or her latest sexual escapade.
42
 Other blogs resemble 
                                                        
35 Once the school administrator gained access to a law student‘s IP 
address, he or she would have to take affirmative steps to then locate the 
particular websites the student had visited. 
36 Not only are blogs and social-networking sites large and popular, but 
Morris seems particularly concerned about their misuse. The entire introduction 
to Morris‘s article focuses on blog misconduct and she singles-out the social-
networking site Facebook as enabling students to ―openly celebrate law 
students‘ illegal, immoral, or unwise behavior.‖ Morris, supra note 12, at 53–56 
(citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 58. 
38 Sydney Jones & Susannah Fox, Generations Online in 2009, in PEW 
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 5 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
(follow ―Generations Online in 2009‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
39 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
40 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 49 (―Blogs . . . enable people to express 
themselves like they‘ve never been able to before. They encourage people to 
share their lives with strangers, to open up their diaries to the world.‖). 
41 See Lunch in a Box, http://lunchinabox.net (last visited, Feb. 28, 2009). 
42 For example, an entry on the personal blog of a then twenty-six-year-old 
bartender from New York reads: ―My period is way late, and I haven‘t been laid 
in months, so I don‘t know what the fuck is up.‖ Emily Nussbaum, Say 
Everything, N.Y. MAG. Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://nymag. 
SABIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  1:08 PM 
 EVERY CLICK YOU MAKE 707 
traditional web sites that disseminate news and information on 
specific subjects like celebrity gossip,
43
 real estate,
44
 politics,
45
 and 
the law.
46
 Many of these ―news‖ blogs have supplanted traditional 
media outlets as major sources for news and information.
47
 
Whether blogs are personal or more professional in nature, they 
are nevertheless dynamic platforms where groups of individuals 
exchange thoughts and ideas.
48
 Once the blogger creates the 
original content, blog readers augment that content by posting 
responses and comments.
49
 Thus, blogs are ―more akin to an 
ongoing conversation than to a mainstream media publication or 
broadcast.‖50 
Similarly, social-networking sites allow ―friends and 
acquaintances . . . [to] interlink their profiles, share personal 
information, and communicate with each other.‖51 Over eighty-five 
                                                        
com/news/features/27341/. 
43 See, e.g., Gawker.com homepage, http://www.gawker.com. 
44 See, e.g., Curbed.com homepage, http://www.curbed.com. 
45 See, e.g., Huffingtonpost.com homepage, http://www.huffington 
post.com. 
46 Lawyers have become prolific bloggers. For example, Abovethelaw.com, 
which was started by a former Assistant U.S. Attorney from Newark, New 
Jersey, has emerged as required reading for law students and lawyers thirsting 
for inside information regarding law firm salaries, hiring, and firing. See 
Jonathan Miller, He Fought The Law. They Both Won, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2006, at 14NJ1. Meanwhile, Blawg.com is a directory of over 2,000 legal blogs, 
many of which are authored by law professors. Blawg.com homepage, 
http://www.blawg.com (follow ―About‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
47 For example, the political blog Talkingpointsmemo.com is largely 
credited with publicizing then Senate majority leader Trent Lott‘s controversial 
comments regarding Senator Strom Thurmond. See Paul Krugman, The Other 
Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A39. 
48 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 49 (―Blogging allows people to exchange 
experiences . . . . Blogging represents the very best that communication has to 
offer.‖). 
49 See Blogger.com (follow ―Quick Tour‖ hyperlink) (―In simple terms, a 
blog is a web site, where you write stuff on an ongoing basis. New stuff shows 
up at the top, so your visitors can read what‘s new. Then they comment on it or 
link to it or email you. Or not.‖). 
50 SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 9. 
51 Id. at 26. 
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percent of college students have a social networking profile,
52
 
while Facebook alone claims more members (roughly 100 
million)
53
 than the population of Germany (roughly eighty-two 
million).
54
 On Facebook,
55
 users can ―tag‖ photographs from last 
night‘s party, link to an article on CNN.com, and wish a friend 
good luck on her torts exam by writing on her ―Wall.‖56 
Additionally, Facebook users can maintain an ongoing 
commentary about their own emotional and psychological state by 
constantly updating their Facebook ―status.‖57 Lastly, users can 
limit access to their Facebook profile to specific individuals or 
groups.
58
 
While Morris believes that blogs and social-networking sites 
merely allow students to enjoy an ―extended adolescence,‖59 the 
                                                        
52 Tufekci, supra note 29, at 25. 
53 Blog Posting of Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, to The Facebook 
Blog, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blog_id=company (Aug. 26, 2008, 
12:21 EST).  
54 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2009). The Boy Scouts of America, meanwhile, claims only 
around four million members. Boy Scouts of America National Council, 
available at http://www.scouting.org (follow ―Fact Sheets‖ hyperlink; then 
follow ―BSA at a Glance‖ hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). 
55 Other popular social networking sites include Myspace, Xanga, and 
Livejournal. See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 24. 
56 The ―Wall‖ feature on a Facebook profile is like a digital bulletin board 
where friends can post short messages. See ―Facebook‖ Wikipedia page, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (describing the ―wall‖ as ―a space on 
every user‘s profile page that allows friends to post messages for the user to 
see‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
57 Facebook provides users with a ―status‖ space on their profile where they 
can write a short message describing what they are doing, thinking, or feeling at 
any particular moment. Status updates tend towards the witty, clever, and 
mundane. 
58 See http://www.facebook.com (follow ―Privacy‖ hyperlink) (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2009). Users can control who has access to their photographs, personal 
information, and status updates. See http://www.facebook.com (follow ―Click 
here to go to Privacy Settings‖ hyperlink) (membership required) (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2009). 
59  Morris, supra note 12, at 56. 
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overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise.
60
 In fact, studies 
indicate that perpetual online chatter may actually enhance our 
social, technological, literacy, and interpersonal skills.
61
 
B. How Incessant Online Activity Makes Us Better  
It is easy to dismiss much of this online chatter as exhibitionist, 
narcissistic, and mindless.
62
 People over the age of thirty often 
belittle the young and wired as ―pornographic little loons who post 
their diaries, their phone numbers . . . [and] their stupid poetry‖ 
and yet ―have zero attention span, flitting like hummingbirds from 
one virtual stage to another.‖63 Morris similarly dismisses Internet 
activity, lampooning law students as enjoying an ―‗extended 
adolescence‘ marked by inappropriate and immature behavior.‖64 
This response, however, fails to consider the complex political, 
social, and cultural implications of perpetual online 
communication.
65
 
First, constantly communicating the often-banal details of 
one‘s life through blogs or Facebook may actually foster, rather 
than erode, interpersonal relationships.
66
 By allowing individuals 
                                                        
60 See Tamar Lewin, Study Finds Teenagers’ Internet Socializing Isn’t Such 
a Bad Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A20. 
61 Id. 
62 See Claire Suddath, 25 Things I Didn’t Want to Know About You, 
TIME.COM, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article 
/0,8599,1877187,00.html. 
63 Nussbaum, supra note 42, at 3. 
64 Morris, supra note 12, at 56. 
65 See Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of 
Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social 
Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (2007). 
66 See Lewin, supra note 60 (―It may look as though kids are wasting a lot 
of time hanging out with new media, whether it‘s on MySpace or sending instant 
messages . . . [b]ut their participation is giving them the technological skills and 
literacy they need to succeed in the contemporary world. They‘re learning how 
to get along with others.‖) (quoting Mizuko Ito, lead researcher of the 
MacArthur Foundation study, available at http://www.macfound.org/) (follow 
―New Study Shows Time Spent Online Important for Teen Development‖ 
hyperlink). 
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to share small, seemingly irrelevant bits of personal information, 
blogs and social networking sites increase emotional awareness.
67
 
For example, a person would probably not call his friend at ten 
P.M. to tell her that he had just stubbed his toe. But on Facebook, 
he can post the infuriating toe-stubbing incident in his status bar. 
His friends can then learn about it at their leisure. Over time, the 
mundane details add up: a toe-stubbing today, bad sushi tomorrow 
night, a difficult day at the office on Friday. Social scientists call it 
―ambient awareness.‖68 Technology journalist Clive Thompson 
explains that ―[e]ach little update—each individual bit of social 
information—is insignificant on its own, even supremely 
mundane. But taken together, over time, the little snippets coalesce 
into a surprisingly sophisticated portrait of your friends‘ and 
family members‘ lives, like thousands of dots making a pointillist 
painting.‖69 
In addition to ―ambient awareness,‖ blogs and social-
networking sites promote collective action and group cohesion.
70
 
In the political realm, for instance, both 2008 presidential 
candidates used blogs and social-networking sites to raise millions 
of dollars in small online donations.
71
 President Obama recruited 
and organized thousands of volunteers through his Facebook 
network and even released photographs of his election night 
celebration on the photo-sharing website Flickr.com.
72
 The 
                                                        
67 See Lewin, supra note 60. 
68 See Clive Thompson, The Brave New World of Digital Intimacy, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html. 
69 Id. at 3. And the information shared on blogs and social-networking sites 
is not always mundane. According to one study of undergraduate social 
networking profiles, forty-six percent revealed their political views, seventy-two 
percent their sexual orientation, and roughly forty-five percent their religion. 
Tufekci, supra note 29, at 28. 
70 See Madison, supra note 31, at 154 (The Internet ―is about people, not 
merely about information. Computing builds connections, networks, and 
pathways for information and activity, channels that . . . enable the group.‖).    
71 See Michael Luo, Obama’s September Success Recasts the Campaign 
Fund-Raising Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A21.  
72 See Damien Cave, Generation O Gets its Hopes Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2008, at ST1. Obama also has a Twitter account with over 300,000 followers. 
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political influence of blogs and social-networks, however, is not 
limited to traditional political parties.
73
 Moveon.org, the 
progressive online advocacy group with over 3.2 million 
members,
74
 is largely credited with delivering the House of 
Representatives to the Democrats in 2006.
75
 In addition, 
Jewsvote.org attracted over two million viewers to The Great 
Schlep, an online video where comedian Sarah Silverman urged 
Jewish voters to convince their grandparents in Florida to vote for 
Obama.
76
  
Blogs and social-networking sites have also democratized the 
nature of knowledge and information.
77
 In his book The Wisdom of 
Crowds,
78
 James Surowiecki argues that large, diverse, and 
decentralized groups are often more effective than individuals at 
solving problems.
79
 Consider Wikipedia,
80
 the open-source, online 
                                                        
Barack Obama Twitter Page, http://twitter.com/BarackObama (last visited Feb. 
23, 2009) (registration required). 
73 See Jose Antonio Vargas, Moveon Grows Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2008, 
at C01. 
74 See Moveon.org, http://www.moveon.org/ (follow ―About‖ hyperlink) 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2008). 
75 See Vargas, supra note 73. Moveon.org spent $28 million promoting 
Democratic candidates in 2006. The National Rifle Association, meanwhile, 
spent $11 million. Moveon.org uses blogging technology and email blasts to 
raise money from its online faithful, get out the vote on Election Day, and 
pressure representatives through online petitions. Id. 
76 Patrick Oppmann, “Great Schlep” Pitches Obama to Florida Jews, 
CNN.COM, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/13/great. 
schlep/index.html. The Great Schlep also has a Facebook group with over 
24,000 ―schleppers.‖ The Great Schlep Home Page, http://www.thegreatschlep. 
com (follow ―the Great Schlep‖ hyperlink). 
77 See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Doubleday 
2004). 
78 Id. 
79 See Madison, supra note 31, at 171–72 (arguing that technology allows 
users to form ―cognitive groups‖ that are better able to solve problems than 
individuals acting alone).  
80 Technically, Wikipedia is a ―wiki‖ rather than a blog. See ―Wiki‖ 
Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (describing a ―wiki‖ as ―a 
page or collection of Web pages designed to enable anyone who accesses it to 
contribute or modify content, using a simplified markup language‖) (last visited 
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encyclopedia of, from, and by the people.
81
 With over ten million 
articles
82
 on everything from Justin Timberlake‘s discography83 to 
Derridean deconstruction,
84
 Wikipedia has become the preferred 
destination for students, journalists, and laymen to confirm and 
create historical fact.
85
 And despite the seeming unreliability of 
thousands of people cobbling together a history of the world, 
Wikipedia has proven surprisingly accurate: according to a 2005 
Nature study, its science articles are just as accurate as those in 
Encyclopedia Britannica.
86
  
Meanwhile, other individuals directly tap into their social-
networks to solve problems through a process known as 
―microsharing.‖87 For example, when Laura Fitton, a social-media 
consultant, asked the 5,000 or so people following her Twitter 
posts
88
 for help after her accountant made a mistake on her tax 
return, she received several lawyer referrals within minutes.
89
 
                                                        
Dec. 1, 2008). 
81 Wikipedia claims over 75,000 contributors and 684 million visitors a 
year. Wikipedia Page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2008). 
82 Press Release, Wikipedia Foundation, Wikipedia Hits Milestone of Ten 
Million Articles Across 250 Languages (Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://wikimediafoundation.org (follow ―Press Room‖ hyperlink; then follow 
―28 March 2008‖ press release hyperlink). 
83 ―Justin Timberlake Discography‖ Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Justin_Timberlake_discography (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
84 ―Jacques Derrida‖ Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derrida 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
85 See Brock Read, Can Wikipedia Ever Make the Grade?, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Oct. 27, 2006, at 31. 
86 See Wikipedia Survives Research Test, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4530930.stm.  
87 See Pistachio Consulting homepage, http://pistachioconsulting.com 
(follow ―Microsharing‖ hyperlink) (―[M]icrosharing fosters collaboration, 
communication, professional development, finding answers and resources and 
other well-demonstrated effects that can optimize business performance.‖). 
88 Twitter is a ―real-time short messaging service‖ that users can access via 
the web or cell phone. See Twitter homepage, http://twitter.com/ (follow ―About 
Us‖ hyperlink). Twitter posts, or ―tweets,‖ work in much the same way as 
Facebook ―status updates.‖ 
89 Thompson, supra note 68, at 6. 
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Fitton says that she ―can solve any problem on Twitter in six 
minutes.‖90 Meanwhile, according to New York Times technology 
journalist David Pogue, a judge on a grant proposal committee 
asked his Twitter followers if a certain proposal had been tried 
before.
91
 Pogue reported that ―in 15 seconds, his followers replied 
with Web links to the information he needed. No e-mail message, 
phone call or Web Site could have achieved the same effect.‖92 
Individuals are increasingly engaging in this sort of ―microsharing‖ 
through Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr for everything from 
emotional support to professional guidance.
93
  
By increasing interpersonal connections and promoting the 
formation of dynamic groups, the Internet has fundamentally 
transformed the way that law students relate to the world.
94
 This is 
not to say that the Internet is not also a vehicle for procrastination, 
mischief, and mindless fun.
95
 Rather, the point is simply that 
Internet use among law students is not nearly as monolithic as 
Morris suggests.
96
 Given the breadth and scope of Internet activity, 
any proposal to infringe on that activity—let alone one as broad 
and sweeping as the Morris Plan—should be examined with 
exacting scrutiny to ensure that the plan does not violate individual 
constitutional rights. 
                                                        
90 Id. 
91 David Pogue, Twitter? It’s What You Make It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2009, at B1. 
92 Id. 
93 See Microsharing, supra note 87 (―Microsharing reduces the emotional 
and intellectual distance between people and helps them become more engaged, 
connected, effective and collaborative.‖). 
94 This is admittedly a cursory and incomplete examination of the Internet‘s 
social and cultural effects. Entire books have been written about the subject. See, 
e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN 
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).   
95 For example, the ―Kitten Cannon‖ computer game provides hours of 
neuron-depleting fun. Addicting Games, http://www.addictinggames.com/ 
kittencannon.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  
96 See Morris, supra note 12, at 56. 
SABIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  1:08 PM 
714 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
The First Amendment provides that ―Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble . . . .‖97 Although ―freedom of 
association‖ is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has consistently found such a freedom inherent in 
the First Amendment‘s protection of free speech and free 
assembly.
98
 The First Amendment protects all associational 
content
99
 from both direct and indirect attacks.
100
 Group 
association, the Court has held, enables ―[e]ffective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones.‖101 Thus, the right of free association ―lies at the foundation 
of a free society.‖102  
                                                        
97 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
98 See NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (―It 
is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the . . . Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.‖). See also Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (―[W]e have long understood 
as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment 
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of 
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.‖); Linda E. 
Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the 
Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 636 (2004) (―The right [of free 
association] is not freestanding, but exists only in order to enable the exercise of 
other constitutional rights.‖). 
99 See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61 (―[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs 
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or 
cultural matters.‖). 
100 For example, regulations that merely ―chill‖ the exercise of free 
association are still subject to the ―closest scrutiny‖ under the First Amendment. 
Id. at 461. See also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 
539, 544 (1963) (―Freedoms such as [free association] are protected not only 
against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled from more 
subtle governmental interference.‖) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 
523 (1960)). 
101 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
102 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1960). 
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The right to free association, however, is not absolute.
103
 The 
First Amendment protects only those associations that are 
―expressive‖ in nature.104 The Court has construed ―expressive 
association‖ broadly,105 noting that ―[a]n association must merely 
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be 
entitled to protection.‖106 Also, the government may limit 
associational freedoms if the limitation serves ―compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be 
achieved through a means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms.‖107  
Freedom of association cases have evolved along two separate 
but related lines.
108
 First, there are cases in which the right to free 
association has been indirectly infringed, or ―chilled,‖ by 
government regulation.
109
 The second line of cases involves direct 
infringement of associational freedoms by government regulations 
prohibiting organizations from excluding certain individuals.
110
 
A. Indirect Attack: Disclosure of Membership Lists 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the ―freedom to 
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas‖ is 
                                                        
103 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
104 Id. (―To determine whether a group is protected by the First 
Amendment‘s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the 
group engages in ‗expressive association.‘‖). 
105 See Strandburg, supra note 30, at 784 (―The Court‘s definition of an 
‗expressive association‘ deserving protection is broad . . . .‖). 
106 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. While an expressive association must have some 
degree of organization, it does not have to disseminate a specific message, 
express itself through a particular ―method,‖ or have unanimity of opinion 
among its members. Id. at 655. 
107 Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 
(1984)). 
108 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 
(indirect infringement); Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (direct infringement). 
109 Cases involving indirect infringement are typically ones requiring 
membership disclosure. See, e.g., NAACP, 357 U.S. 449. 
110 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Bd. of 
Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Dale, 530 U.S. 640. 
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protected under the First Amendment.
111
 Indirect infringements on 
associational freedoms are generally prohibited,
112
 and will only be 
upheld if substantially related to compelling state interests.
113
 Most 
indirect infringements on associational freedoms have occurred 
through state attempts to compel disclosure of organizations‘ 
membership lists.
114
  
In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court found that the mandatory 
disclosure of NAACP membership lists violated the First 
Amendment because the privacy of group membership was ―so 
related to the rights of the [NAACP] members to . . . associate 
freely with others.‖115 The Court struck down the disclosure 
requirement because it did not have a ―substantial bearing‖ on a 
substantial state interest.
116
 Similarly, the disclosure requirement in 
Shelton v. Tucker
117
 was also invalidated because the inquiries into 
public teachers‘ past associational ties ―impair[ed] that teacher‘s 
right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech 
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free 
                                                        
111 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. 
112 See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 
(1963). 
113 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (―[E]ven though the 
government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be 
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the 
end can be more narrowly achieved.‖). 
114 See, e.g., NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Gibson, 372 
U.S. 539. 
115 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466. The Court dismissed Alabama‘s contention 
that any suppression of free association resulting from the disclosure of 
membership lists would come from private actors and not the state. Id. at 463 
(―[I]t is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the 
production order that private action takes hold.‖). 
116 Id. at 464 (―Whether there was ‗justification‘ in this instance turns 
solely on the substantiality of Alabama‘s interest in obtaining membership 
lists.‖). The Court found that there was no substantial bearing between 
disclosure of NAACP membership lists and the state‘s interest in enforcing its 
business registration policies, but the Court was silent as to whether the state‘s 
business registration policy was itself a ―substantial interest.‖ Id. at 464–65. 
117 364 U.S. 479. The case involved an Arkansas statute requiring every 
public school teacher to annually file an affidavit disclosing every organization 
to which she had belonged, or contributed, within the previous five years. 
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society.‖118 The Court found that even though the state had a 
legitimate interest in inquiring into teachers‘ past association 
activities, the ―unlimited and indiscriminate‖119 means to serve that 
interest excessively burdened associational freedoms.
120
 Likewise, 
the Court struck down the Arizona State Bar‘s requirement that 
applicants disclose membership in the Communist Party, holding 
that Arizona had a ―legitimate interest‖ in evaluating the character 
and fitness of individuals seeking to practice law in the state, but 
that that interest was not served by requiring disclosure of 
Communist Party membership.
121
  
On the other hand, the Court found that the surveillance of 
political activity by the U.S. Army did not violate individuals‘ 
right to free association in Laird v. Tatum.
122
 There, the Court 
found that the alleged chilling effect on associational freedoms was 
merely speculative,
123
 and that there was no claim of a ―specific 
                                                        
118 Id. at 485–86. 
119 Id. at 490. 
120 Id. at 488 (―[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and 
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.‖). 
See also, Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
There, the Court struck down Florida‘s mandatory disclosure of NAACP 
membership in order to identify its Communist members. The Court suggested 
that while the state may have had a compelling interest in uncovering members 
of the Communist Party, the disclosure requirement was not substantially related 
to that interest. Id. at 547–48 (―[T]he Communist party is not an ordinary or 
legitimate political party, as known in this country, and . . . because of its 
particular nature, membership therein is itself a permissible subject of regulation 
and legislative scrutiny.‖). Presumably, if there was evidence of Communist 
activity by NAACP members, infringement of their associational freedoms 
would pass judicial scrutiny. 
121 Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971). In particular, the Court 
found that Arizona had ample basis to evaluate the petitioner‘s character and 
fitness because she had already disclosed organizations to which she belonged 
since the age of sixteen. Id. at 7. 
122 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
123 Id. at 13 (noting that the respondents‘ claims arose from a ―speculative 
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information 
in some way that would cause direct harm to the respondents‖). 
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present objective harm or threat of specific future harm.‖124  
In sum, state actions such as mandatory disclosure of 
membership lists that indirectly ―chill‖ free association violate the 
First Amendment unless substantially related to compelling state 
interests.
125
 The same holds true for direct infringements on 
associational freedoms.
126
 
B. Direct Attack: Prohibitions on Associational Exclusion 
Government attempts to directly prohibit or restrict an 
association‘s membership will only be upheld if they ―serve 
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, 
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive 
of associational freedoms.‖127 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
for example, the United States Jaycees, a nonprofit civic 
organization for men,
128
 challenged a Minnesota statute prohibiting 
gender discrimination in places of public accommodation.
129
 The 
                                                        
124 Id. at 14. 
125 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
126 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
127 Id. at 623. This strict scrutiny standard of review mirrors the standard of 
review for indirect infringements on free association but with several important 
differences. First, the Court suggests that regulations are ―narrowly drawn‖ 
when they are the ―least restrictive on associational freedoms.‖ Id. Second, the 
Court adds the additional requirement that government infringements on free 
association must be ―unrelated to the suppression of ideas.‖ Id. Although the 
Court does not articulate a specific standard of review for governmental 
infringements on ―intimate associations,‖ its language suggests that they would 
be subject to at least strict scrutiny, if not something more stringent. See id. at 
620 (―[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State‘s power 
to control the selection of one‘s spouse that would not apply to regulations 
affecting the choice of one‘s fellow employees.‖). 
128 Women could only become ―associate‖ members, which meant that they 
could not vote, hold national or local office, or participate in various leadership 
programs. Id. at 613. 
129 Id. at 614–15. The Act also prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, disability and national origin. Id. at 615. The Act 
defined ―places of public accommodation‖ broadly to include businesses, 
accommodations, refreshments, entertainment, recreation and transportation 
facilities that are made available to the public. Id. 
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Court upheld the statute, holding that ―Minnesota‘s compelling 
interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens 
justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees 
may have on the male members‘ associational freedoms.‖130 In Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale,
131
 however, the Court invalidated a 
seemingly similar New Jersey public accommodations law, which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of, among other things, 
sexual orientation.
132
 The Court held that New Jersey‘s public 
accommodations law imposed a significant burden on the Boy 
Scouts‘ associational freedoms.133 The Court was notably silent on 
whether New Jersey had a compelling interest to eradicate 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
134
 
In this line of cases, the Court has also indicated that the right 
to free association is available only to associations that are either 
                                                        
130 Id. at 623. Specifically, the Court found that the Jaycees ―failed to 
demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious burdens on the male members‘ 
freedom of expressive association.‖ Id. at 626–27. See also Bd. of Dirs. v. 
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that a California 
statute prohibiting the Rotary Club and other civic organizations from excluding 
women did not violate the First Amendment because it served the compelling 
state interest of eliminating discrimination against women and imposed no 
significant infringements on the Rotary Club members‘ associational freedoms). 
131 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
132 Id. James Dale successfully sued the Boy Scouts in New Jersey state 
court for violation of the law after they expelled him for being homosexual. Id. 
at 646–47. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the public 
accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts‘ right to free association 
because New Jersey had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination and 
the law did not significantly burden the Boy Scouts‘ associational freedoms. Id. 
at 647. 
133 Id. at 656. The Court concluded that the Boy Scouts were burdened by 
the law because the organization believed that ―homosexual conduct [was] 
inconsistent with the values it [sought] to instill in its youth members . . . .‖ Id. 
at 654. The Court based this finding on its inspection of the Boy Scout Oath and 
Law, position statements, and public pronouncements. Id. at 649–53. 
134 Id. at 657 (recognizing that ―in cases such as Roberts . . . [s]tates have a 
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public 
accommodations,‖ but refusing to say whether states have a similar interest in 
eliminating discrimination against homosexuals in public accommodations).   
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―intimate‖ or ―expressive.‖135 ―Intimate associations‖ are ―intimate 
human relationships‖ such as marriage, childrearing, and 
cohabitation with one‘s relatives.136 ―Expressive associations,‖ 
meanwhile, are larger and more attenuated relationships, which are 
an ―indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties‖ 
protected by the First Amendment.
137
 The Jaycees
138
 and Boy 
Scouts
139
 were both considered ―expressive associations‖ for free 
association purposes because they are ―collective effort[s] on 
behalf of shared goals‖ that are ―especially important in preserving 
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression 
from suppression by the majority.‖140 In City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin,
141
 however, the Court upheld a Dallas city ordinance 
restricting admission in certain dance halls to people between the 
ages of fourteen and eighteen
142
 because ―chance encounters in 
dance halls‖ are not ―expressive association[s].‖143 In upholding 
the statute, the Court emphasized that the dance club did not 
constitute an expressive association in large part because its 
admission policy was not selective, the teenagers had no real 
relation to each other, and they did not ―take positions on public 
                                                        
135 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
136 Id. at 617, 619.  
137 Id. at 618. 
138 Id. at 622 (―In view of the various protected activities in which the 
Jaycees engages . . . that right [to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends] is 
plainly implicated in this case.‖). 
139 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (―It seems 
indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values 
engages in expressive activity.‖). 
140 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622. The Court noted that expressive associations 
may be political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural in nature. 
Id. 
141 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
142 Id. at 20. 
143 Id. at 25 (―We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons—coming 
together to engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First 
Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a form of ‗intimate 
association‘ nor as a form of ‗expressive association‘ as those terms were 
described in [Jaycees].‖).  
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questions‖144 or perform any of the other similar activities 
described in Duarte.
145
 
In sum, the First Amendment right to free association is 
violated when: (1) the association is expressive or intimate in 
nature; (2) associational freedoms have been directly or indirectly 
infringed; and (3) the infringement is not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.
146
 
III. THE MORRIS PLAN: INDIRECT ATTACK ON FREE ASSOCIATION 
The Morris Plan seeks to regulate a wide range of Internet 
activities by requiring disclosure of ―online aliases, e-mail 
addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and social networking site profile 
information.‖147 By doing so, the Morris Plan would unlawfully 
infringe on law students‘ right to free association.148 First, the 
Internet activities targeted for disclosure are expressive in 
nature.
149
 Second, the disclosure requirement, like the disclosure 
requirements in NAACP
150
 and Shelton,
151
 has an objective 
―chilling effect‖ on law students‘ associational freedoms.152 
Finally, although states may have a compelling interest to ensure 
the character and fitness of future lawyers, the disclosure 
                                                        
144 Id. 
145 Those activities included ―humanitarian service, high ethical standards 
in all vocations, good will, and peace.‖ Bd. Of Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987). 
146 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
147 Morris, supra note 12, at 58. Presumably, when Morris says that ―blogs‖ 
should be disclosed, she means that individuals who operate or contribute to a 
blog must reveal the name of the blog and/or the alias used in making blog 
posts.  
148 Morris acknowledges that the disclosure requirement would deter 
students from engaging in certain online activities. See id. (―The more salient 
effect [of the disclosure requirement] is the in terrorem signal to the applicant 
that online identity is a relevant part of character to be evaluated by 
authorities.‖).  
149 See infra pp. 722–25. 
150 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
151 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
152 See Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
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requirement is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest. 
A. Expressive Association 
As a threshold matter, the Internet activities targeted by the 
Morris Plan are entitled to First Amendment protection only if they 
are ―expressive associations.‖153 This requires a fact-specific 
inquiry into the ―size, purpose, policies, [and] selectivity‖ of a 
particular activity.
154
 The problem is that the Morris Plan 
implicates virtually all Internet activities.
155
 While online aliases 
and IP addresses are not themselves ―expressive associations,‖ 
they are vital tools with which individuals engage in ―expressive 
association‖ online. IP addresses, for example, are essential to 
every online activity from web browsing to email.
156
 Similarly, 
―online aliases‖ include screen names and user names for message 
boards, commercial websites, and instant messaging 
applications.
157
 This Note focuses on the expressive nature of the 
online associations specifically mentioned by Morris: blogs and 
social-networking sites.
158
 
1. Blogs 
Blog creators and contributors are members of expressive 
associations.
159
 First, blogs are organized.
160
 Blog creators and 
                                                        
153 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (―To 
determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment‘s expressive 
associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in ‗expressive 
association.‘‖). 
154 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).  
155 See Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
156 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 147 (―Whenever a user communicates over 
the Internet, her IP address is logged.‖). 
157 For example, Facebook requires an email address and user name. 
Facebook Homepage, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). So 
does the Volokh Conspiracy, a popular legal blog. Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).  
158 Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (requiring disclosure of ―blog and social 
networking site profile information‖). 
159 Blog readers, on the other hand, would probably not be considered 
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contributors have the shared goal of creating, consuming, and 
disseminating news and information about a particular topic.
161
 
While a blog‘s community may be vast and largely anonymous, it 
is still organized around a central digital hub where ideas and 
opinions are expressed.
162
 Second, blogs have a degree of 
selectivity.
163
 Although blogs typically have no formal 
membership procedures, they screen users by requiring registration 
of a username and password before individuals can post comments 
or responses.
164
 Finally, blog activity is distinctly expressive in a 
way that teenagers gathered at a dance hall are not.
165
 Blogs are not 
merely places of ―social association,‖166 but digital soapboxes 
where users ―take positions on public questions.‖167 Blogs have 
even acquired the reputation for advancing a pugnacious brand of 
punditry.
168
 In sum, blogs are precisely the kind of ―expressive 
                                                        
members of an expressive association because merely reading material on a blog 
is not ―expressive.‖ 
160 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 20 (describing the mechanics and structure 
of blogging). 
161 The fact that blog contributors may not unanimously agree on 
everything or disseminate a specific message does not mean that it cannot still 
be an expressive association. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 
(2000) (―The First Amendment simply does not require that every member of a 
group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be ‗expressive 
association.‘‖). 
162 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 19 (―Blogging is the rage these days. We 
can all be pundits now, sharing our thoughts and pictures with a worldwide 
audience.‖). 
163 Id. at 20 (noting that users must set up an account, and sometimes pay a 
monthly fee, in order to create a blog). 
164 For example, Abovethelaw.com requires contributors to provide a 
username, email address, and password. Above the Law Sign Up, 
http://abovethelaw.com/profile/signup (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
165 See generally City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
166 Id. at 23. 
167 Id. at 25. 
168 For example, after the 2008 presidential election, Vice-Presidential 
contender Sarah Palin dismissed many of her critics as ―bloggers in their 
parents‘ basement just talking garbage.‖ See David Hinckley, Sarah on the 
Offense: Takes to the Media & Says She’ll Plow Through The Door If There’s 
An Opening, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 11, 2008, at 6. 
SABIN_6-5-09 6/6/2009  1:08 PM 
724 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
association‖ that have been recognized by the Supreme Court 
because they are ―collective effort[s] on behalf of shared goals‖ in 
which individuals ―associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends.‖169 
2. Social Networking Sites 
Social networking sites like Facebook are also expressive 
associations.
170
 Facebook literally organizes groups of individuals 
according to educational, geographic, political, and religious 
categories.
171
 In this sense, Facebook is the digital analog to 
traditional organizations such as the NAACP and Boy Scouts.
172
 
Also, like traditional organizations, Facebook has formalized 
membership procedures whereby individuals must create an 
elaborate user profile in order to join a particular network.
173
 The 
Facebook community also exercises a degree of selectivity because 
users can restrict access to their profiles.
174
 Finally, Facebook 
activity is distinctly ―expressive‖ because members constantly 
―take positions on public questions‖175 through ―Wall‖ posts, 
                                                        
169 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
170 Since the Morris Plan specifically identifies Facebook as an example of 
a social networking site, this Note uses Facebook as representative of all social 
networking sites. Morris, supra note 12, at 56 (discussing ―Facebook.com 
profiles that openly celebrate law students‘ illegal, immoral or unwise 
behavior‖). 
171 This is not an exhaustive list. Facebook users can create network 
categories based on everything from favorite bands to favorite foods. 
172 In fact, both of those organizations have Facebook networks with 
thousands of members. See Facebook.com homepage, http://www.facebook. 
com/ (search for NAACP and Boy Scouts) (registration required) (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2009). 
173 For example, only individuals with a Brooklyn Law School email 
address can join the Brooklyn Law School network on Facebook.  
174 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
175 The fact that those ―public positions‖ might range from Brad Pitt‘s new 
movie to Barack Obama‘s cabinet selections has no bearing on Facebook‘s 
status as an expressive association. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (―Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs 
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―Status Updates,‖ and personal notes.176 Even if much Facebook 
chatter is personal and trivial, Dale makes clear that an association 
need not disseminate a specific ―message‖ or advocate a particular 
position in order to be expressive.
177
 Rather, the association must 
―merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in 
order to be entitled to protection.‖178 
B. The Chilling Effect of Disclosure Under the Morris Plan 
Upon review of the expressive association nature of blogs and 
social networking sites, it is clear that the Morris Plan‘s disclosure 
requirement indirectly infringes on law students‘ right to free 
association by chilling the exercise of their associational freedoms. 
The Morris Plan creates a chilling effect because its unlimited 
and indiscriminate scope would create ―serious burdens‖179 on the 
associational freedoms of law students. In Shelton, the Court found 
that the disclosure of all associational activities within a five-year 
period chilled associational freedoms because it was ―completely 
unlimited.‖180 The Morris Plan is similarly unlimited: it requires 
the disclosure of all blogging and Facebook activity within a three-
year period.
181
 The exhaustive reach of the disclosure requirement 
provides law students and prospective law students with no 
                                                        
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious, or 
cultural matters.‖). 
176 These highly personal Facebook connections might even qualify as 
―intimate associations.‖ See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 
(1984) (describing ―intimate associations‖ as involving ―deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not 
only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one‘s life‖).  
177 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000). The Dale Court 
also noted that ―[t]he First Amendment protection of expressive association is 
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must 
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.‖ Id. at 648. 
178 Id. at 655. 
179 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626. 
180 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
181 See SOLOVE, supra note 2. 
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meaningful direction as to how to regulate their online activities.
182
 
Before typing every blog post or Facebook message, students 
would wonder whether they were being monitored by the school 
administration.
183
 Thus, like the teachers in Shelton, the pressure 
upon a law student to ―avoid any ties which might displease those 
who control his professional destiny would be constant and 
heavy.‖184 Forced to choose between exercising their First 
Amendment rights and obtaining a legal education, many students 
would likely choose the latter.
185
 
Additionally, the chilling effect under the Morris plan would be 
―objective.‖186 Unlike the alleged chilling of associational 
freedoms in Laird, the chilling effect under the Morris Plan derives 
from a specific and known governmental regulation directed at 
specific individuals.
187
 In Laird, the chilling effect was merely 
―subjective,‖ and thus unprotected by the First Amendment, 
because the petitioners did not know who or what the military was 
monitoring.
188
 Under the Morris Plan, however, each individual 
                                                        
182 In fact, the disclosure requirement imposed on law students through the 
Morris Plan is virtually identical to the disclosure requirement imposed by 
President Barack Obama on applicants for positions within his cabinet. See 
Jackie Calmes, For a Washington Job, Be Prepared to Tell All, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2008, at A1 (reporting that job applicants must reveal ―blog posts and 
links to their Facebook pages,‖ in addition to ―all aliases or ‗handles‘ used to 
communicate on the Internet‖). 
183 This is precisely the point of the Morris Plan. See Morris, supra note 12, 
at 58 (noting that the purpose of the disclosure requirement is to send the 
message: ―Clean up your act. We‘re watching.‖). 
184 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486. 
185 The overly broad scope and breadth of the Morris Plan is especially 
troubling within the educational context. As the Court in Shelton observed: ―The 
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools.‖ Id. at 487. 
186 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972). 
187 Under the Morris Plan, each applicant would have to disclose her online 
identifying information. Thus, each applicant would know that she was being 
directly monitored. Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
188 Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (noting that the chilling effect arose ―merely from 
the individual‘s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain 
activities‖). The Court‘s distinction between subjective and objective ―chilling 
effects‖ functions as a standing requirement limiting the extent to which the 
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student is required to disclose his or her online associational 
activities, thus giving rise to a ―threat of specific future harm‖189—
namely, the threat of retaliation if the school disapproves of the 
student‘s online activities.190 This chill on associational freedoms 
is therefore objective, rather than speculative and subjective, and is 
protected under the First Amendment. 
Since the Morris Plan imposes an ―objective‖ chilling effect on 
law students‘ expressive associations, it will only be upheld if it is 
narrowly drawn to a compelling state interest and ―unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas.‖191 
C. Compelling State Interest? 
It is not immediately clear what state interest is served under 
the Morris Plan. On the one hand, Morris writes that the disclosure 
requirement is necessary ―[t]o avoid further injury to the reputation 
of our law schools and our legal profession.‖192 This would not 
likely rise to the kind of substantial state interest recognized by the 
Court in its free association cases because it does not involve 
compliance with a state statute,
193
 the competency of public 
employees,
194
 or issues of domestic security.
195
 
                                                        
Court will recognize an indirect infringement claim under the First Amendment. 
189 Id. at 14. 
190 See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that ―online identity is a 
relevant part of character to be evaluated by authorities‖) (emphasis added). It is 
not clear who exactly these ―authorities‖ might be. 
191 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
192 Morris, supra note 12, at 53. 
193 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
194 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
195 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Reputational integrity involves 
highly subjective matters of public perception that may or may not implicate 
some other substantial state interest. For example, perhaps reputational integrity 
in public law schools is necessary to promote public confidence in its legal 
institutions. But Morris is silent as to what state interests might be served by 
maintaining the reputational integrity of state law schools. Thus, without further 
explanation, the state does not have a compelling interest in protecting the 
reputation of its law schools. 
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On the other hand, Morris suggests that the disclosure 
requirement is necessary to ensure the ―character and fitness‖ of 
future lawyers.
196
 This likely is a compelling state interest.
197
 In 
Baird, the Court found that Arizona had ―a legitimate interest in 
determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and 
the professional competence requisite to the practice of law.‖198 
Similarly, Shelton found that the state had a compelling interest to 
―investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to 
teach in its schools.‖199 Thus, the state arguably has an analogous 
interest to ensure the fitness and competency of its law students, 
especially considering the public role they will have as future 
attorneys.  
However, even if the Morris Plan does serve a compelling state 
interest, the disclosure requirement is directly related to the 
suppression of ideas and therefore violates the First 
Amendment.
200
 Morris concedes that the purpose of the disclosure 
requirement is to ―discourage‖ law students from engaging in 
anonymous and offensive online conduct.
201
 Moreover, the Morris 
Plan uses veiled threats to ensure that offensive student online 
association
202
 is sufficiently suppressed.
203
 Thus, the stated 
purpose of the Morris Plan is to suppress the expression of those 
ideas that Morris, or the law school, deems offensive.
204
 The Court 
has consistently held that such governmental infringements on free 
association cannot stand.
205
 
                                                        
196 Morris, supra note 12, at 57. 
197 See Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
198 Baird, 401 U.S. at 7. 
199 Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485. 
200 See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that the disclosure requirement 
―discourages‖ online behavior that is ―anonymous‖ and ―stupid‖). 
201 Id. at 53, 58 (emphasis added). 
202 Morris neglects to define offensive online conduct, nor does she suggest 
how law schools might arrive at their own definition. 
203 Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that law students must be ―caught‖ 
and that online identities will be ―evaluated by authorities‖). 
204 See id. at 58. 
205 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
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D. Least Restrictive on Associations’ Freedoms 
The Morris Plan also fails strict scrutiny because the state 
interest to promote the character and fitness of future lawyers can 
be achieved ―through a means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms.‖206 
The Morris Plan is over inclusive because it does not 
discriminate between blogs with a history of user abuse, such as 
Autoadmit.com, and blogs with no such history of user abuse.
207
 
Also, the Morris Plan requires disclosure of all blogging and 
social-networking activity, rather than only those that might 
promote inappropriate behavior.
208
 But the Supreme Court has 
rejected overreaching of this sort.
209
 In Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigation Committee,
210
 for instance, the Supreme 
Court struck down the mandatory disclosure of NAACP 
membership lists because there was no ―substantial connection‖ 
between the NAACP and the Communist Party.
211
 Here, there is no 
substantial connection between many of the blogs targeted by the 
Morris Plan and harmful online conduct.
212
 The mere fact that 
some students have used the Internet for illegitimate purposes does 
not establish a ―substantial connection‖ between the Internet and 
illegitimate behavior that could justify the sweeping scope of the 
Morris Plan.
213
 
                                                        
206 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
207 See Nakashima, supra note 7. 
208 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 147.  
209 See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
210 372 U.S. 539 (1963). 
211 Id. at 548. 
212 If the Morris Plan were limited only to Autoadmit.com, it would come 
much closer to being narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. But it is 
not, and Morris fails to show a substantial connection between other blogs or 
websites and harmful online conduct.    
213 Saying that there is a substantial connection between the Internet and 
harmful conduct would be like saying that there is a substantial connection 
between telephones and offensive language. 
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In short, the Morris Plan reaches too far.
214
 Like the invalidated 
disclosure requirement in Shelton, the Morris Plan effectively 
requires students to disclose ―every conceivable kind of 
associational tie‖ on the Internet.215 It seeks to broadly regulate a 
medium that is a conduit for all kinds of expressive associations. 
Many of them are socially valuable,
216
 and many of them are 
not.
217
 However, the Supreme Court has explicitly found that the 
First Amendment protects expressive association, regardless of its 
content.
218
 To withstand the strict scrutiny triggered by 
infringements on the right to free association, the Morris Plan 
must, at a minimum, exercise a greater degree of selectivity.
219
 
IV. LESS RESTRICTIVE WAYS TO COMBAT INTERNET MISCONDUCT 
There are several other less restrictive methods to curb 
inappropriate online activity among law students.
220
 One 
alternative is for law schools to institute a policy of ―traceable 
anonymity.‖221 Under such a policy, students would be free to 
engage in anonymous (or pseudo-anonymous) online activities so 
long as their true identity could be traced in the event of harmful 
online conduct.
222
 With ―traceable anonymity,‖ writes Daniel 
Solove, professor of law at Georgetown University Law School, 
―we preserve the right for people to speak anonymously, but in the 
                                                        
214 See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (―Thus, my proposal: request a three-
year history of online aliases, e-mail addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and social 
networking site profile information.‖). 
215 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
216 See, e.g., WALL ST. J., Law Blog homepage, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
217 See, e.g., PerezHilton.com homepage, http://perezhilton.com (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
218 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) (―The First 
Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not.‖). 
219 See id. at 648 (noting that infringements on free association may be 
upheld if they serve compelling state interests ―that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms‖).  
220 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146. 
221 Id. at 146. 
222 See id. at 146–47. 
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event that one causes harm to another we‘ve preserved a way to 
trace who the culprit is.‖223  
―Traceable anonymity‖ is wise public policy because it deters 
harmful online conduct without restraining associational 
freedoms.
224
 Law students would be free to develop robust online 
associations without fear that the administration was 
―watching.‖225 Furthermore, ―traceable anonymity‖ already exists 
with most, if not all, of the online activities targeted by the Morris 
Plan
226
 since both blog posts and Facebook profiles are tied to a 
user‘s IP address.227 Thus, law school administration could track 
down the perpetrator of any online harm with relative ease.
228
 
In addition, law schools could supplement ―traceable 
anonymity‖ and give it some teeth with a ―Technology 
Appropriate Use‖ policy.229 These policies provide specific ethical 
and legal standards for students accessing the Internet on school 
computers or through school wireless networks.
230
 Such a policy 
would provide students with clear standards and notice of the 
disciplinary consequences following violations of those 
standards.
231
 
                                                        
223 Id. at 146. 
224 See id. at 147. 
225 Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
226 See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146 (―Traceable anonymity is for the most 
part what currently exists on the Internet.‖). 
227 See id. at 146–47 (―Whenever a user communicates over the Internet, 
her IP address is logged . . . . It is indeed possible to make yourself untraceable, 
but it involves significant care and know-how.‖). 
228 See id. 
229 Many, if not most, colleges and universities have some kind of 
―appropriate use‖ policy for Internet use. See, e.g., Pace Law School, 
Appropriate Use Policy for Information Technology, 
http://www.pace.edu/page.cfm?doc_id=27208 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
230 For example, Yale University‘s ―Information Technology Appropriate 
Use Policy‖ prohibits technology use that ―impedes, interferes with, impairs, or 
otherwise causes harm to the activities of others.‖ Yale University Technology 
Appropriate Use page, http://www.yale.edu/policy/itaup.html (last visited Feb. 
28, 2009). 
231 See id. 
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Finally, law schools could implement information campaigns 
that educate students on the legal and ethical consequences of 
inappropriate online conduct.
232
 As part of this effort, law schools 
could inform students of the limits of free speech within the school 
environment.
233
 Furthermore, law schools should advise 
prospective employers of their online obligations.
234
 For example, 
according to Facebook‘s Terms of Use, the website is available for 
―personal, non commercial use only.‖235 Thus, use of Facebook by 
law firms to vet job applicants may be ―commercial use‖ that 
violates Facebook‘s Terms of Use.236  
These are but several methods by which law schools might 
decrease harmful and offensive online conduct without trampling 
on student associational freedoms. But there is no silver bullet. 
Rather, law school deans must exercise intelligence and creativity 
to create a safe learning environment in which students can go 
online freely without worrying that their every online move is 
being ―evaluated by authorities.‖237   
                                                        
232 Morris acknowledges that schools should ―reinforce‖ the disclosure 
requirement by ―[cautioning] first-year law students about maintaining 
appropriate online personas.‖ Morris, supra note 12, at 58. It is not clear, 
however, why this alone would not be sufficient to serve the compelling state 
interest to ensure the character and fitness of future lawyers. 
233 For example, language that constitutes a ―true threat‖ or ―fighting 
words‖ would not be protected under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Roberts 
Martin, supra note 24; Sanders, supra note 24. 
234 See Carly Brandenburg, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A 
Social Networker’s Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597 (2008). 
235 Facebook, Terms of Use, User Conduct, http://www.facebook.com/ 
home.php#/terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (emphasis added). 
236 There may be recent precedent for this type of violation. In November 
2008, a jury convicted a California mother for computer fraud because she 
violated the MySpace user agreement by creating a false MySpace profile. The 
woman used the fraudulent profile to harass a teenage girl who ultimately 
committed suicide. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud 
Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A25. For a detailed discussion of 
how employers use social-networking sites to vet job applications, and how such 
use may violate the law, see Brandenburg, supra note 234. 
237 Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
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CONCLUSION 
Harmful and offensive online conduct among law students is a 
serious problem.
238
 Its remedy, however, requires a nuanced 
approach that minimizes infringement of associational freedoms 
while deterring and detecting online abuse. The Morris Plan does 
not strike this balance. First, it constructs a simplistic caricature of 
law students‘ Internet use that fails to recognize the depth and 
complexity of their online expression.
239
 Second, the Morris Plan 
is so broad and indiscriminate that it is certain to intimidate law 
students and keep them from exercising their associational 
freedoms online.
240
 Finally, the Morris Plan ignores alternative 
measures, such as ―traceable anonymity‖ and targeted disclosure, 
which would deter harmful online conduct without trampling on 
associational freedoms.
241
  
―Clean up your act,‖ Morris scolds law students. ―We‘re 
watching.‖242 But the Morris Plan watches the wrong thing. Rather 
than peering at blog posts and staring at status updates, law schools 
should be watching out for law students‘ constitutional rights. 
Odds are it will be a more worthwhile endeavor.  
                                                        
238 See Nakashima, supra note 7. 
239 Morris, supra note 12, at 56. 
240 Id. at 58. 
241 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146. 
242 Morris, supra note 12, at 58. 
